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I.

INTRODUCTION

In his seminal work, The Rise of the Novel,1 Ian Watt posits an analogy between the readers of a novel and the members of a jury:
The novel's mode of imitating reality may ...be equally well summarised in terms of the procedures of another group of specialists in
epistemology, the jury in a court of law. Their expectations, and
those of the novel reader coincide in many ways: both want to know
"all the particulars" of a given case-the time and place of the occurrence; both must be satisfied as to the identities of the parties
concerned, and will refuse to accept evidence about anyone called
Sir Toby Belch or Mr. Badman ...they also expect the witness to
tell the story "in his own words." The jury, in fact, takes the "circumstantial view of life," which T.H. Green found to be the characteristic outlook of the novel.
This comparison has formed the foundation for much subsequent
work on law-and-literature. Alexander Welsh, for example, begins his
analysis of Tom Jones with Watt's analogy, which he finds "fully warranted." 3 Given its centrality in our field, it is necessary to examine
Watt's claim more closely. In this paper, I will test his analogy between reader and juror by bringing it into dialogue with a mid-Victorian novel, William Thackeray's Vanity Fair.4 I will then argue against
the use of analogies as the basis for interdisciplinary work by demonstrating that the logic of fiction inherently resists the hermeneutic
* Special thanks to Jan Schramm for her advice and guidance. I am also
indebted to Yota Batsaki, Andrew Counter, and Robert Macfarlane for the insightful
comments.
1. IAN WATT,THE RISE OF THE NOVEL (1st ed. 1957).
2. Id. at 32.
3. ALEXANDER WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS: NARRATIVE AND CIRCUMSATANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND 48 (1992).
4. WILLIAM THACKERAY, VANITY FAIR (2003).

417
Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

1

Texas Wesleyan
Review, Vol. 12LAW
[2022],REVIEW
Iss. 1, Art. 20
TEXASLawWESLEYAN

[Vol. 12

strategy of the courtroom. I will conclude by gesturing towards an
alternative model of interdisciplinary analysis.
II.

THACKERAY AND WATr IN DIALOGUE

Vanity Fair is chosen for its exemplary traits of formal realism: it
focuses on the "always unique and therefore new" 5 experience of its
heroine, Becky Sharp, as she seeks to move upwards socially; it emphasizes the details of the concrete and materialist world in which
Becky lives; it shows how characters change through time and it takes
pains to create an illusion of immediacy through its minute descriptions of places. One possible objection to the choice of Vanity Fair is
that the use of a third person narrator puts Thackeray in the tradition
of Henry Fielding, whom Watt regarded as less of a pioneer as a novelist than Samuel Richardson.6 The counter-argument to that objection is that while both writers make use of third person narrators, the
authorial comments in Vanity Fairin fact perform very different functions from those of, say, Joseph Andrews or Tom Jones. For Watt,
Fielding's mock epic style means that he conveys truth through his
own authorial voice, and thus strays from the conventions of formal
realism. Thackeray's narrator, on the other hand, abolishes the distance between his world and that of the reader by incessantly reminding him that the world of the story is the same as the one he
inhabits. The collapse of the distance between narrator and reader
occurs most dramatically in chapter sixty-two, in which the narrator
reveals himself as someone who met Dobbin and Amelia on their
tour. He is not some detached, omniscient narrator observing from
afar. That the narrator can mingle with the characters in the novel
places him on an equal level with the inhabitants of the Fair, and
hence on an equal level with the reader.
The best way of testing Watt's analogy is to highlight a contentious
legal issue in the novel and to compare the way it presents the facts to
the reader with the way a lawyer presents facts to the court. Let us,
then, focus on one of the issues in the novel which have generated the
liveliest debate amongst literary critics7 : does Becky Sharpe commit
adultery with Lord Steyn?
As the quotation at the beginning of this essay indicates, Watt
claims that the reader would approach this question with the mindset
of a juror. Let us therefore set up the legal framework of analysis. As
W.M. Best points out in his nineteenth-century textbook on evidence,
quoting Lord Stowell, there is no need to prove adultery through di5. WATT, supra note 1, at 13.
6. Id. at 272-73.
7. See BARBARA HARDY, THE EXPOSURE OF LUXURY (1972); G. Armour Craig,
On the Style of Vanity Fair, in THACKERAY: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS,
(Alexander Welsh ed., 1968).
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rect evidence. 8 The question, then, is whether there is sufficient indirect evidence to convict Becky. Her husband certainly seems to think
so. 9 There are two possible interpretations of the episode in which
Rawdon returns home to find his wife entertaining Lord Steyn at their
house. These two interpretations correspond to the two methods of
inferring the evidentiary fact from the principal fact: through inference from the circumstances, and through attestation by a witness or a
party directly involved. 10 It is possible to conclude that Becky has
been in an extra-marital affair with Lord Steyn, and purposefully
keeps her husband in prison to facilitate her liaison with him. This is
Rawdon's interpretation, and he reaches his conclusion through drawing an inference from the circumstances. Yet Becky gives a different
account of the incident," and insists that she was entertaining Lord
Steyn in the house only to secure for her husband the appointment to
the highly prestigious post of Governor of Coventry Island. This version of events comes directly from Becky, and is therefore an attestation by a party directly involved.
III.

EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST BECKY

To start with Rawdon's interpretation: his verdict of guilt is based
entirely on the circumstances, which confront him upon his return to
the house. His wife had written to say that she did not have the
money to bail him and had claimed to be suffering from "a headache
and ... a heartache" in bed when she found out that he was imprisoned. 2 Yet, when he returns home, he finds that Becky, far from bedbound, had in fact invited Lord Steyn to their matrimonial home, and
was laughing gaily and singing to him.1 3 His suspicions are confirmed
by the words of Lord Steyn, who, when Becky meekly proclaims her
innocence, exclaims: "You innocent! Why, every trinket you have on
your body is paid for by me. I have given you thousands of pounds
which this fellow has spent, and for which he has sold you. Innocent,
by ... !"14
In Rawdon's eyes, even Becky's accomplice steps forward to incriminate her. The final piece of evidence which determines his guilty
verdict is the discovery that she had hidden from him a note for one
thousand pounds which Lord Steyn had given her, a discovery which
8. See W. M. BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE AS TO PROOFS IN COURTS OF COMMON LAW; WITH ELEMENTARY RULES FOR
CONDUCTING THE EXAMINATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES 321

(London, S. Sweet, 1849).
9. THACKERAY, supra note 4, at 624.
10. See generally BEST, supra note 8, at 314-45 (discussing the differences between
direct and circumstantial evidence).
11. THACKERAY, supra note 4, at 640-42.
12. Id. at 620.
13. Id. at 622.
14. Id. at 623.
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breaks his heart: "You might have spared me a hundred pounds,
Becky, out of all this-I have always shared with you."1 5
At first glance, the novel seems to support Watt's thesis, for the
narrator explicitly invites the reader to act as the jury by asking for his
opinion: "Was she guilty or not?"' 6 Indeed, Rawdon here acts as the
reader's surrogate, forming his conclusion based on the evidence in
front of him. The circumstantial evidence as outlined above seems to
point unambivalently to Becky's guilt.
Yet, if the narrator invites judgment, he also makes the formation of
an authoritative judgment difficult. When he resumes this thread of
the narrative two chapters later, he presents new evidence, which casts
doubt on the incriminating potential of the previous situation. As
Becky hurries to Sir Pitt's house, she says to herself "Good Heavens!
was ever such ill luck as mine! ...to be so near, and to lose all. Is it
all too late?"' 7 She is here presumably referring to her near success in
securing the promise of Rawdon's appointment from Lord Steyn, and
hence of achieving both financial security and social respectability.
Significantly, she is speaking to herself, a venting of her frustration
intended no one but herself. For this reason, she cannot possibly be
lying. The notion that she may be deceiving herself as she speaks is
pre-empted by the novel's pairing of Becky and Amelia, in which the
former's perceptiveness and resourcefulness are contrasted with the
latter's illusions and naivety. Unlike Amelia, Becky is not easily
deceived, least of all by herself. Whatever doubt there is over the
sincerity of her other utterances, this is one moment in the narrative in
which Becky is clearly saying what she thinks. What this direct attestation reveals, then, is that she really was acting for the benefit of her
husband in inviting Lord Steyn for dinner.
The novel offers further evidence of this view when Becky arrives at
Sir Pitt's house. The reader is told that news of Rawdon's appointment had already been announced in the newspapers: "Is this true,
what I see in the paper, then?" is the first question Sir Pitt asks when
he sees Becky, to which Becky answers "It is true,"'" another instance
of direct affirmation. The reliability of Becky's statement is supported
by the text: the narrator explicitly tells us that Becky has not had an
opportunity to read the paper on that day, for she "did not rally from
the state of stupor and confusion in which the events of the previous
night had lunged her intrepid spirit, until the bells of Curzon Street
chapels were ringing for afternoon service."' 9 She never leaves the
reader's attention from that point on, until she reaches Sir Pitt's residence. If Becky is aware of the announcement in the papers, it can
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 624.
at 625.
at 640.
at 636.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss1/20
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V12.I1.19

4

2005]

Wan: Taking Ian Watt to Court, or How Do Jurors Read Stories?

TAKING IAN WATT TO COURT

only be because she procured the appointment herself. The narrator
manages the evidence in the novel so that the reader is first given
enough evidence to pronounce a guilty verdict on Becky, and then is
given further evidence which seemingly exculpates her.
So is Becky innocent then? If the reader scrutinizes the chronology
of the new evidence, this interpretation of events does not fit the facts
perfectly either. She tells Sir Pitt that Lord Steyn had secured Rawdon's appointment on Friday, following the news of the death of the
previous Governor of Coventry Island.2" Rawdon was arrested the
same evening, "the night of that fatal ball."' 21 On Saturday, she receives her husband's request for bail, and Rawdon finds her with Lord
Steyn on Saturday evening.22
Now, if she had known about the appointment on Friday, as she
professes to Sir Pitt, then by Saturday evening her husband's position
would have been assured. Why, then, was she asking whether it was
too late? And why was she still entertaining Lord Steyn in her home
that Saturday evening, when news of the appointment had already
come the day before? Most suspiciously, if she really is not having an
affair with Lord Steyn, why did she not come to Rawdon's rescue on
Saturday, after she received his letter? Her excuse that Lord Steyn
had offered to pay the bail, so that she was prevented from going to
Rawdon, is unsatisfactory, for surely she would have been able to persuade him to settle Rawdon's expenses without making him spend another night in prison. The evidence is not only dizzying, but it simply
does not add up to enable the reader to form a judgment over the
alleged crime. As soon as incriminating evidence is proffered, contrary evidence partially redeems Becky, and then further evidence
partially, but again not completely, undermines the second set of
evidence.
When both inference from circumstances and direct attestation fail,
judgment becomes impossible. This impossibility of impartial judgment is further compounded by the multiple interpretations of
Becky's behaviour in the novel. To start, almost at random, with Lady
Jane's verdict: "To be a wicked woman-a heartless mother, a false
wife! . . . She has deceived her husband, as she has deceived everyworldliness, and all sorts of crime.
body; her soul is black with vanity,
23
I tremble when I touch her."
This judgment is undermined almost immediately after it is rendered, for the narrator reveals that Lady Jane proceeds to spy on
Becky and Sir Pitt from her window after she leaves them. 24 As Barbara Shapiro has shown, the law has since its inception placed the
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 641.
Id. at 640.
THACKERAY,

supra note 4, at 622.

Id. at 642.
Id.
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greatest emphasis on choosing people who are morally dependable
and socially acceptable to serve as members of the jury.25 Lady Jane's
sneaky behaviour not only brings her closer to the deceitful Becky
than she would have liked to admit, but also disqualifies her as a juror.
Her position implicitly asks the difficult question of whether anyone,
including the reader, is sufficiently detached from the mores and conventions of the Fair to pronounce a judgment on Becky.
Furthermore, Lady Jane's judgment stands in direct contrast to
judgments pronounced on Becky two pages later in the novel. When
the soldiers in the regiment find out that Rawdon has been appointed
Governor of Coventry Island, they credit his wife for his success, and
one soldier refers to Becky as a "virtuous woman" who is "a crown to
her husband." 26 Then, two pages later, another person, Wenhum,
reveals that he and his wife had been invited to dine with Becky and
Lord Steyn, and swears that Becky is "a most spotless and innocent
lady."27 With all of these judgments circulating in the novel around
him, Rawdon no longer knows what he thinks, and can only convince
himself of Becky's guilt by claiming that "[i]f she is not guilty.., she's
as bad as guilty," 28 a statement which betrays the fact that he does not
in fact know whether she is guilty or not. Rawdon's judgment, Lady
Jane's judgment, the soldier's judgment, Wenhum's judgment, the narrator's judgment ...in the face of these conflicting interpretations, all

partial, all unsatisfactory, the reader does not know whom to believe,
nor can he decide how to render his judgment. He has to suspend
judgment.
IV.

JUDGMENT, UNDECIDABILITY, AND THE LOGIC OF THE NOVEL

What the question of adultery in Vanity Fair reveals, then, is that
ambiguity and undecidability constitute the logic of the novel.
Neither the circumstantial evidence which confronts Rawdon, nor the
direct attestation by Becky, adds up to allow the reader to reach a
final verdict. Of course, the courtroom is also a site of ambiguity, but
the ambiguity which the jury confronts in the court is necessarily of a
different kind from the ambiguity which the reader confronts, for two
reasons.
Firstly, and most obviously, the evidence in the court, no matter
how ambiguous, always points to a referent. The existence of the
referent gives rise to the illusion that the evidence presented before
the jury could potentially act as a transparent window to the crime.
This illusion is a necessary one, as no system of law can be built upon
the conception of such categories as rape or grievous bodily harm as
25. BARBARA SHAPIRO, THE CULTURE OF FACT (2000) (illustrating the importance of selecting morally dependable people for jury duty).
26. THACKERAY, supra note 4, at 644.
27. Id. at 647.
28. Id. at 650.
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absence. While the court may acknowledge that the jury might not
hand down the correct verdict every time, it must still institutionally
presuppose that the "truth" about a crime can be directly accessed.
The evidence in a novel, on the other hand, has no referent. All of the
characters in Vanity Fair,no matter the extent to which they resemble
or are based on real people, are fictive creations. The reader who
approaches the novel like a juror intent on finding a referent will be
doomed to re-enact the tragedy of the Sarrasinean artist in Barthes'
S/Z, who finds beneath all of the layers he attempts to penetrate the
"nothingness of castration." 9
This difference between the two institutions implies that they handle ambiguity differently. In the courtroom, the mode is adversariaP:
ambiguity is generated by the presentation of different, often conflicting, evidence by the prosecution and the defence. Each side is trying
to convince the court that their version of the facts is closer to the
referent. The jury, as the body which hands down the verdict, is therefore institutionally under an obligation to choose between the two sets
of evidence. From the beginning of the court case, their goal, and
their duty, is to choose one side over the other, to approach the facts
with the conviction that one side is truer than the other.
The novel, on the other hand, does not have an obligation to be
faithful to an external referent when the narrator tells the reader
about an alleged crime. The ambiguity here is brought about by a
playful, rather than adversarial, presentation of evidence. 31 The narrator gives us evidence which points one way, then presents evidence
which points the other way, and finally undermines both positions.
That fiction is capable of a plurality of meanings has long been recognized: S/Z has shown us that even the most "readerly" of texts has an
element of "writability" in it, that no literary text, which is worthy of
the name would yield a single, determinate meaning. The example of
Vanity Fair shows that the playful ambiguity constitutes not only the
logic of meaning in the text, but the presentation of evidence as well.
What the reader finds in the novel, and in literature in general, is what
Geoffrey Hartman calls a "crisis of evidentiality. ' ' 32 It is impossible
for the reader to reach a definitive verdict, because the presentation
of evidence means that the facts cannot be assembled in a way which
yields a single, coherent, convincing narrative revealing any pre-discursive "truth" about the crime. The reader of the novel who tries to
29. See generally ROLAND BARTHES, S/Z (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc. trans.,
1992) (1974) (referring to the Sarrasinean artist's experience).
30. See generally, JOHN LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL
TRIAL (2003) (discussing the history of the adversarial system).
31. See Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Humanities, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE, 278-293 (Alan Bass trans., 1997), for an example
of the theorization of the notion of play.
32. GEOFFREY H. HARTMAN, CRITICISM IN THE WILDERNESS 282-83 (1980).
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act as juror always finds that "[e]vidence fails or is disabled, and unusual or ungovernable types of interpretation come into play."3 3
Far from being "under an obligation to satisfy the reader"3 4 with all
the details of the story, then, the narrative mode of the novel refuses
to allow him to fall on either side of the guilty/innocent divide when
adjudicating a criminal act. Instead, it places him between the two,
allowing him to position himself in an "in-between" space unattainable in the courtroom, and enabling him to relish ambiguity and undecidability. It is for this reason that the logic of fiction resists the
hermeneutic strategy, which Watt propounds. The reader who approaches evidence in fiction the way a juror approaches evidence in
court is bound to be frustrated by fiction's playful ambiguity. Fiction
has a way of presenting evidence which is unique. It celebrates ambiguity, multiple meanings, and plural interpretations. The reader,
therefore, ought to relish it, to respect this distinctive mode of handling facts, rather than to subsume it with the logic of the court.
V.

THE DANGER OF ANALOGIES

The example of the Watt's model highlights the danger of using simple analogies as the basis for interdisciplinary work in literature and
the law. When one sees points of similarity between two fields, it is
tempting to bring those points together as an analogy, and to construct an analysis based on it. Yet, such an analogy, while seemingly
placing two elements on equal terms, almost always privileges one
term over the other. This means that interdisciplinary work based on
analogical reasoning almost invariably imposes the methodology of
one discipline over the other, leading to the danger of overlooking, if
not completely eradicating, the distinctive qualities of the other discipline as an institution.
To avoid this kind of cannibalisation, interdisciplinary work should
move from a mode, which sees similarity first, to a mode which sees
difference first. In other words, instead of bringing literature and the
law together through a perceived similarity in a common topic or concept, it should first and foremost ask how the differences between the
two disciplines are reflected in that link. If both lawyers and literary
critics interpret texts, or engage with evidence, then the initial focus
should not be on how they perform those acts in a similar manner, but
on how they do it differently. Each discipline has its distinct logic, its
own conception of the relationship between language and reality, and
its unique means of conceiving of itself as a field. Only when we have
thought through the differences should we focus on the similarities.3
33. Id. at 283.
34. WATT, supra note 1, at 32.
35. See
TION

RICHARD

A.

POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE:

A

MISUNDERSTOOD RELA-

13, 17 (1988), in which Posner makes a similar point. While I agree with Posner's
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In this way, the interdisciplinary enquiry starts from a foundation,
which respects both literature and the law as institutions.3 6 As Peter
Brooks points out, real inter-disciplinarity occurs "when thought
processes reach the point where the disciplinary boundary one comes
up against no longer makes sense when the internal logic of thinking
impels a transgression of borderlines."3 7 To remain true to the distinctive qualities of each discipline, we must respect their institutional
boundaries before we attempt to move beyond them, rather than to
ignore their existence from the beginning. Stories are powerful because they have their own logic and conventions. We, as law-andliterature critics, forget that at the peril of the very project in which we
are engaged.
fundamental claim about the differences between literature and the law, I am more
optimistic about the possibility of cooperation between the two fields.
36. See generally HARRY LEVIN, THE GATES OF HORN 16-23 (1963) (referring to
literature as an institution). See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, GLANVILLE WILLIAMS:
LEARNING THE LAW, (A.T.H. Smith ed., 2002), for an example of a canonical text
which initiates students to the law as an institution.
37. Peter Brooks, Must We Apologize?, in COMPARATIVE LITERATURE IN THE
AGE OF MULTICULTURALISM 97, 102 (Charles Bernheimer ed., 1995).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

9

